The Governor's power over State Bills under Articles 200 and 201 of the Constitution of India has become one of the most contested sites of Indian federalism. In State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (2025), a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court read timelines into Article 200 and, invoking Article 142, declared ten Bills to have received deemed assent. Months later, a five-judge Bench answering a Presidential Reference under Article 143 rejected both judicially fixed timelines and deemed assent. It held that the Governor has only three options, may exercise discretion in choosing among them, and is answerable only to a 'limited mandamus' for prolonged, unexplained and indefinite inaction. This article argues that the Reference, read carefully, does not restore unfettered gubernatorial discretion. By foreclosing the pocket veto and confirming that inaction is justiciable, it accepts the premise that the Governor's power is held in trust for the constitutional scheme. Drawing on constitutional morality, the federal structure recognised in S.R. Bommai, and the Constituent Assembly's understanding of the office, the article proposes a framework of 'duty-bound discretion' resting on four obligations: to decide, to give reasons, to act in good faith, and to act within reasonable time. It contends that this framework fills the space the Reference left open, gives content to the undefined limited mandamus, and points towards institutional reform, including a constitutional amendment prescribing outer time limits, as the legitimate path to the certainty the Court declined to supply.
The growing use of digital platforms has made the collection and processing of personal data a part of everyday life. While consent is often treated as the primary means of protecting individual privacy, the reality is more complicated. Lengthy privacy policies, limited alternatives and unequal bargaining power can make it difficult for individuals to understand what they are agreeing to or to exercise genuine control over their personal information. This article examines the consent framework under India's Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, in light of the constitutional recognition of privacy by the Supreme Court in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India. It argues that consent remains important but cannot, on its own, provide adequate protection in a digital environment where individuals may lack the information or practical freedom needed to make informed choices. The article therefore emphasises the need for clear privacy notices, responsible data processing, accessible grievance redressal and stronger institutional accountability. It concludes that meaningful data protection requires more than obtaining an individual's agreement; it requires a framework in which organisations are held responsible for how personal data is collected, used and protected.
India's 2025 Standard Operating Procedure for non-consensual intimate imagery directs significant social media intermediaries to detect recurring content through hashes and, where onboarded, to communicate collated hashes to the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre. The February 2026 amendment reduces the complaint-based removal period to two hours, while Rule 3(1)(g) separately requires preservation of removed information and associated records for 180 days. These measures create a discrete evidentiary problem. A content match may justify renewed removal yet provides no standalone account of the particular upload, the responsible account or the system that produced an evidentiary output. Through doctrinal analysis of the IT Rules, the 2025 NCII SOP, the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam and the decisions in X v Union of India and Arjun Panditrao Khotkar, this article identifies a provenance gap between the reusable detection fingerprint and the individual dissemination incident. It proposes a two-record protocol linking a restricted prevention identifier to a separately preserved, event-specific record of each removal, with source-system information, integrity data and a lawful export pathway supporting Section 63 certification. The analysis distinguishes existing duties from proposed implementation specifications and confines its claims to what public legal materials establish. The resulting approach maintains rapid protection while preventing evidence of similarity from being mistaken for proof of personal attribution.
Greenwashing occurs when financial products, companies, or institutions make misleading claims about their environmental sustainability. As more capital flows into assets labelled "sustainable," misleading claims have been sending that money to the wrong places, which reduces investor trust and weakens the climate goals that sustainable finance is meant to support. This article examines whether international treaties can effectively prevent false sustainability claims. It argues that the existing treaties, led by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement, set general duties for the states on the matter relating to climate action and transparency. However, these treaties do not establish direct rules for private financial entities. Therefore, the treaties work indirectly through national laws, regional regulations, and soft-law standards such as the IFRS sustainability disclosure standards and the guidance of the International Organization of Securities Commissions. By analysing legal aspects and comparing enforcement in the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, the article highlights three key issues: There is no universally accepted definition of sustainable finance, enforcement varies across countries and remains inconsistent, and cooperation between regulators across borders is limited. It concludes that a new global treaty on this issue is unlikely in the near term. A more realistic approach is to build on existing treaty principles by recognizing each other's disclosure standards, strengthening regulator cooperation, and applying the international legal duties of due diligence and good faith.
The prostitution is not just current fire but it emerged from our historical roots. Prostitution is not just about sexual activity but activating the exponent of humiliation, mental cruelty and lowered self esteem. Irrespective of its negatives, it's thriving faster than the speed of light. The Human Trafficking Act claims to protect women from being trafficked, but are women safe enough? Is the act implemented with the right direction? The response of this question lies with the practices going under the noses of legislators, judiciary and law protectors. The researcher requests to consider sex workers under the category of profession marking how it is thriving in metropolitan cities. The researcher carries out the study about Sonagachi, an area infamous for the trade of girls for prostitution. The researcher in this manuscript pleads to make provisions for protection of sex workers and fights to grant them rights and protection. Legalisation of prostitution is a necessary evil as it will support the de-stigmatisation of sex workers in the future of India which will safeguard the dignity of women from sexual crimes.
The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 allows a child aged sixteen or seventeen who is alleged to have committed a heinous offence to be tried as an adult after a "preliminary assessment" by the Juvenile Justice Board. This paper argues that the transfer mechanism is less a principled answer to serious adolescent offending than a legislative compromise whose costs fall on the procedural guarantees the Act otherwise extends to children. It reads section 15 against the Supreme Court's decisions in Shilpa Mittal and Barun Chandra Thakur, the age-determination case law, and the developmental research on adolescent culpability, and it engages the retributive and victim-centred case for transfer on its own terms. Accountability and rehabilitation, the paper contends, are not two poles to be traded off at a single age threshold. Both depend on institutional capacity that the system has never been resourced to supply: functioning Boards, trained probation staff, individual care plans that are actually followed, and aftercare that reaches young people beyond eighteen. Reform should narrow and proceduralise transfer, introduce statutory diversion, decouple offence classification from the general penal code, and treat implementation failure as a rights violation rather than an administrative shortfall.
