Trade-Based Money Laundering (TBML) disguises the proceeds of crime through legitimate cross-border trade by employing techniques such as over-invoicing, under-invoicing, multiple invoicing, phantom shipments, and misdescription of goods. Opaque corporate structures and divergent national regulatory frameworks further complicate its detection. Adopting a doctrinal approach, this article critically examines India's legal framework for combating TBML under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, the Customs Act, 1962, and applicable banking regulations, with reference to relevant Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards. It identifies key regulatory weaknesses, including fragmented institutional oversight, difficulties in tracing ultimate beneficial ownership, reliance on trade documentation, and limitations in cross-border enforcement. The article also examines the dual role of trade finance instruments, particularly letters of credit and documentary collections, which facilitate international commerce but may also be exploited to legitimise suspicious transactions. It argues that statutory provisions alone are insufficient to address TBML effectively. An integrated, risk-based regulatory approach is necessary, incorporating coordinated enforcement, improved inter-agency information sharing, technology-assisted trade monitoring, greater corporate transparency, and stronger international cooperation.
The Right to Publicity has emerged as a significant legal concept in the protection of an individual’s identity against unauthorised commercial exploitation. An individual’s name, image, voice, likeness, and other distinctive attributes may possess substantial commercial value, yet their use without consent raises serious concerns regarding privacy, dignity, autonomy, and intellectual property. This paper examines the evolution and legal recognition of the Right to Publicity, with particular emphasis on the Indian legal framework and its comparative development in the United States and the European Union. In India, the right has primarily developed through judicial interpretation as an extension of the Right to Privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution, supported by principles of intellectual property protection and the common law of passing off. Landmark judicial decisions, including ICC Development (International) Ltd. v. Arvee Enterprises, D.M. Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. v. Baby Gift House, and Titan Industries Ltd. v. M/s Ramkumar Jewellers, illustrate the judiciary’s efforts to prevent the unauthorised commercial appropriation of personal identity. The paper further analyses emerging challenges arising from social media, artificial intelligence, deepfakes, digital avatars, and virtual platforms, which have made the reproduction and commercial exploitation of personal identity increasingly accessible and difficult to regulate. It also examines the tension between publicity rights and constitutionally protected freedoms of speech and expression, artistic creativity, satire, and legitimate public discourse. Adopting a doctrinal and comparative approach, the study argues that India’s existing fragmented legal framework requires greater clarity and consistency. It recommends the enactment of dedicated legislation defining the scope of publicity rights, establishing effective remedies, and incorporating appropriate safeguards for freedom of expression. The paper ultimately emphasises the need to balance commercial interests with individual dignity, technological innovation, and the fundamental principle that every person should retain meaningful control over the commercial use of their identity.
The transformation of entertainment through digital technologies has created a complex regulatory challenge for contemporary legal systems. Online gaming has emerged as an important component of India's digital economy, generating opportunities in software development, electronic sports, creative industries, digital entrepreneurship and technological innovation. Simultaneously, the expansion of online money gaming has raised serious concerns regarding financial vulnerability, compulsive gaming behaviour, consumer deception, data protection, cybercrime and the protection of minors. The conflict between economic innovation and social protection has consequently become a significant issue in Indian constitutional and regulatory law.
Against this background, Parliament enacted the Promotion and Regulation of Online Gaming Act, 2025, which establishes a national legislative framework for the development of electronic sports and online social games while prohibiting the offering, facilitation, advertising and financial processing of online money games. The Promotion and Regulation of Online Gaming Rules, 2026, which came into force on 1 May 2026, provide an implementation framework for the statutory scheme. The legislation represents a substantial departure from earlier approaches that frequently relied upon distinctions between games of skill and games of chance, as well as a fragmented combination of state gambling laws and general information technology regulations.
This paper critically examines the legislative objectives, institutional arrangements, prohibitions and enforcement mechanisms of the Act. Particular attention is given to the constitutional distribution of legislative powers under Articles 245, 246 and 248 and the Seventh Schedule; the relationship between Entry 34 of the State List and Entry 31 of the Union List; the freedoms guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g); the equality principle under Article 14; personal liberty under Article 21; and the implications of digital surveillance and search powers for informational privacy. The analysis also evaluates the relevance of leading Indian judicial decisions concerning gambling, games of skill, commercial freedom and proportionality.
A comparative assessment of the United States and the United Kingdom illustrates the different ways in which legal systems respond to online gaming risks. Whereas the United States combines federal restrictions with substantial state-level regulatory autonomy, the United Kingdom employs a licensing-oriented framework under the Gambling Act 2005. These approaches provide useful, although not directly interchangeable, models for evaluating India's prohibition-centred strategy.
The paper argues that protecting vulnerable users is a legitimate and important legislative objective, but the effectiveness and constitutional sustainability of regulation depend upon precise definitions, transparent classification, proportionate enforcement, procedural safeguards and independent review. It recommends a comprehensive regulatory approach incorporating evidence-based policymaking, safeguards against unlawful offshore operations, effective grievance redressal, privacy-preserving age verification, consumer education and periodic legislative evaluation. The central conclusion is that digital gaming governance must reconcile public welfare with constitutional accountability and technological development.
Arbitration is often selected because it offers parties a private and comparatively flexible method of resolving disputes. Yet the value of an arbitral process depends not only on the tribunal's decision but also on whether the successful party can obtain the relief granted. This paper examines the legal journey from an arbitral award to its enforcement, focusing on domestic awards in India and foreign awards sought to be enforced in India. It analyses the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, particularly Sections 34-36 and Sections 44-49, alongside the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 (New York Convention). It considers the distinction between setting aside a domestic award and resisting enforcement of a foreign award, the limited role of public policy, and the Supreme Court's approach in Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., Shri Lal Mahal Ltd. v. Progetto Grano SpA, Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. National Highways Authority of India, and Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi SRL. The paper argues that Indian law generally supports finality while preserving safeguards for serious legal and procedural defects. Its central concern is the gap between an award becoming legally enforceable and the successful party actually receiving relief. It concludes that consistent judicial reasoning, proportionate case management, accessible procedural guidance, and effective execution practice are necessary to make enforcement more predictable without weakening legitimate safeguards.
The paper highlights the issue of "hallucinations" of AI-aided Indian Judiciary, stressing on the landmark Supreme Court pronouncement in Pooja Ramesh Singh v. J&K Bank Ltd. (2026). The apex court has declared an absolute xero-tolerance standard for AI-produced unverified precedents, upholding those citations to be professional misconduct under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961. The research paper examines the continuous tussle between the trap of efficiency of automatic legal research and the fundamental constitutional safeguards enshrined in Article 21, that includes the right of a fair trial and speedy justice. Comparing with international judicial pronouncements like the Mata v. Avianca, this study advocates that AI-produced unverified precedents divert the rule of law and vitiate the evidentiary efficacy of adjudication. At last, the paper argues for a strong regulation that makes human verification mandatory, protects judicial decision-making, and transforms judicial education to a antagonistic research pedagogy, guaranteeing that technology is a supportive mechanism that does not jeopardize truth and justice.
In July of 2026, the Supreme Court of India held that a decision based on an AI's hallucination as to what the law is, is "no decision at all." Although the Supreme Court made a good decision on a very limited constitutional basis, the Supreme Court's holding will be an ex post facto blunt instrument, unless there is a procedural obligation placed on the decision maker. Nullity is based on the constitutional rights to fair procedure (Articles 14 and 21) and the requirement of a reasoned decision. A default rule of nullity is better than a materiality test. The most appropriate response would be a technology-neutral duty to verify each authority relied upon against a primary source, to document that verification, and to notify the parties when the court relies upon authority that neither party has cited. When the Draft Regulations for Use of Artificial Intelligence in Courts (2026) are reviewed by the Supreme Court, the proposed regulations state that the verification exemption will not apply to legal authority.
