India's four Labour Codes seek to consolidate a fragmented body of central labour legislation, but their operation remains embedded in a federal constitutional structure. Labour-related subjects are distributed across the Concurrent List, and the Codes allocate rule-making responsibilities between the Central Government and State Governments through the concept of the 'appropriate government'. State Shops and Establishments (S&E) legislation continues to regulate working time, rest intervals, leave and related conditions in commercial establishments. The result is not simply a delay in implementation: it is a continuing question about how central legislation, State rules and independent State statutes are to operate together. This paper examines that question through the Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code, 2020 (OSH Code), with particular attention to Maharashtra, Karnataka and Gujarat. It distinguishes commencement of the Codes from notification of Central Rules and State Rules, and distinguishes draft rules from final rules. The official Maharashtra Labour Department page presents a mixed and internally inconsistent status: it identifies a final Wage Rules document while also listing draft instruments, including draft Wage Rules. Karnataka's 2026 notifications for all four Codes are described in the available Gazette material as drafts. Gujarat has notified final OSH Rules, while its separate S&E statute was amended by Ordinance No. 3 of 2025 and subsequently by Gujarat Act No. 1 of 2026. The paper therefore avoids treating a State's position under one Code as proof of final rules under all four. The constitutional analysis applies Articles 246 and 254 alongside the Supreme Court's decisions in Zaverbhai Amaidas, Deep Chand and M. Karunanidhi. It argues that overlap is not synonymous with repugnancy; the inquiry must identify the precise provisions, their fields of operation, and whether simultaneous obedience is impossible or Parliament intended exhaustive occupation. The Gujarat amendment raises a particularly difficult question because the Gazette establishes Governor's assent but the materials reviewed do not establish reservation for, or assent by, the President under Article 254(2). The paper concludes that a central policy supported by State-specific supplements, backed by a Gazette-based compliance register, is the most defensible operational model for multi-State employers.
The European Union's Eco-design for Sustainable Products Regulation (ESPR) creates a framework for the Digital Product Passport (DPP), with textiles as a priority product category within this framework. Rules for DPPs for textiles are not finalised yet, but the framework might shape information requirements for DPPs and the inclusion of textiles among fashion products entering the EU market. Consequently, the implications of the ESPR might extend beyond the European Union and affect producers of clothing and accessories in countries manufacturing clothes for EU brands. This article considers whether the ESPR's DPP framework can ensure traceability without passing excessive compliance burdens and responsibilities on to suppliers of textile products. The article argues that a DPP can succeed only if traceability is treated as a shared responsibility of regulators and businesses, rather than as a demand for data passed down the supply chain. This is because the ESPR's requirements regarding DPPs target economic operators placing the product on the EU market, but the relevant information may be located in the hands of the supplier of this product. This article outlines the ESPR's framework and proposes the principles of designing the DPP that would be fair and effective. At the same time, the article raises the issue of the implications of DPPs for international trade and mentions the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. It argues that sustainability rules are not, in themselves, contrary to WTO law.
In Sabita Paul v. State of West Bengal, the Supreme Court restored the anticipatory bail of a mother accused of helping her son blackmail a neighbour with obscene photographs. The High Court had cancelled the bail because she suppressed her earlier failed attempts to obtain it. The Supreme Court did not address the suppression. It reasoned that the principal accused, her son, already enjoyed bail, that her role was only to further his acts, and that parity therefore required equal relief. This comment argues that the decision usefully confirms that parity turns on the role of each accused, but leaves three questions open: the effect of suppression on the exercise of discretion, the assumption that custodial interrogation is unnecessary in a case resting on electronic evidence, and the absence of protective conditions for the complainant.
In State of Kerala v. M/s Panacea Biotec Ltd., the Supreme Court restored a prosecution for misbranding a pentavalent vaccine under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, which the Kerala High Court had quashed because the Magistrate did not hold the inquiry required by section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Court held that limitation under section 469(1)(c) runs from the date on which the offenders' identity is established through the inspector's verification, and that a complaint by a public servant in discharge of official duty is not vitiated by want of a section 202 inquiry. It also held that whether directors are in charge of a company under section 34 of the Drugs Act is a question of fact for trial. This comment argues that the reasoning on limitation sits uneasily with the offender specific wording of section 469, that reading section 200 into section 202 conflates two different safeguards, and that substituting accused persons twenty years after the events raises fairness questions the Court left unexamined.
Foreign investment is an integral part of India's economic development and financial-market structure. It offers capital, helps transfer technology, encourages competition, increases the number of investors and brings Indian enterprises into the global markets. Meanwhile, foreign capital may raise issues that are in line with the national security, beneficial ownership, tax avoidance, market volatility, regulatory arbitrage and the concentration of economic power. Indian law, therefore, adopts a differentiated approach in the regulation of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI). In the old days, it was called the FII regime and now the securities-market structure is mostly adopted from the FII regime. The paper focusses on the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (FEMA), Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019, FEMA (Mode of Payment and Reporting of Non-Debt Instruments) Regulations, 2019, FDI Policy by DPIIT, Companies Act, 2013, Competition Act, 2002, SEBI Act, 1992, SEBI (Foreign Portfolio Investors) Regulations, 2019, Depositories Act, 1996 and Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. It reviews their necessity and key statutory provisions, considers some of the key decisions of the Supreme Court and uncovers the unanswered questions of regulation and implementation. The paper ends by proposing a coordinated, risk-based and technologically integrated foreign-investment scheme.
In SEBI v. Rajeev Vasant Sheth, the Supreme Court set aside a Securities Appellate Tribunal order that had accepted that the promoters of Tara Jewels Ltd sold shares to prevent the company's accounts being classed as non performing. The Court held that under the Note to regulation 4(1) of the 2015 Insider Trading Regulations a person who trades while in possession of unpublished price sensitive information (UPSI) is presumed to have been motivated by it, and that the reasons for trading and the application of proceeds are irrelevant. It restored disgorgement of about Rs 1.38 crore of loss avoided, upheld the code of conduct penalties and reduced the Chairman's penalty under section 15G from Rs 25 lakh to Rs 10 lakh. This comment argues that the decision gives a clear compliance rule and rightly confines Abhijit Rajan to the 1992 regime, but that it rests heavily on an explanatory Note, does not reconcile "possession" with section 15G's "on the basis of", gives no illustration of an unenumerated defence, and leaves unexplained why circumstances matter to penalty but not to liability.